





















EXCLUSIVITY AS INEFFICIENT INSURANCE
 
 
























ISSN 0924-7815   1 
Exclusivity as in Exclusivity as in Exclusivity as in Exclusivity as inefficient insurance efficient insurance efficient insurance efficient insurance1  
Cédric Argenton   Bert Willems 
CentER & TILEC, Tilburg University 
15 April 2009 
 
Abstract 
It is well established that an incumbent firm may use exclusivity contracts so as to 
monopolize an industry or deter entry. Such an anticompetitive practice could be 
tolerated if it were associated with sufficiently large efficiency gains, e.g. insuring 
buyers against price volatility. In this paper we study the trade-off between positive 
effects  (risk  sharing)  and  negative  effects  (exclusion)  of  exclusivity  contracts.  We 
revisit the seminal model of Aghion and Bolton (1987) under risk-aversion and show 
that although exclusivity contracts induce optimal risk-sharing, they can be used not 
only to deter the entry of a more efficient rival on the product market but also to 
crowd out financial investors willing to insure the buyer at competitive rates. We 
further show that in a world without financial investors, purely financial bilateral 
instruments,  such  as  forward  contracts,  achieve  optimal  risk  sharing  without 
distorting product market outcomes. Thus, there is no room for an insurance defense 
of exclusivity contracts. 
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1  Introduction 
It  is  well  established  in  the  economic  literature  that  an  incumbent  firm  may  use 
exclusivity  contracts  so  as  to  monopolize  an  industry  or  deter  entry.2  Such  an 
anticompetitive practice could be tolerated if it were associated with some sizeable 
efficiency gains. The issue tackled in this paper is the one of a possible efficiency 
justification of exclusive dealing on grounds of risk-sharing. 
Indeed, consumers in an industry may value the certainty of a constant, known if 
high  price  over  the  sizeable  yet  uncertain  price  slash  brought  about  by  potential 
entry. For example, the profit of energy-intensive manufacturers depends heavily  on 
the  price  of  electricity.  Those  prices  are  volatile  and  there  is  a  lot  of  uncertainty 
regarding their future evolution, because of the unknown development of alternative 
energy production technologies as well as the unsettled nature of the discussions 
about future energy policy. Such manufacturers may prefer long-term arrangements 
with  incumbent energy  suppliers  to  the  vagaries  of future energy  spot  prices.  In 
other terms, they may be risk-averse with respect to electricity prices.3 
Can the insurance provided by a long-term exclusivity contract be invoked in order 
to justify its use in the face of its negative impact on competition? To address this 
question, we revisit and extend the seminal model of Aghion and Bolton (1987) to 
deal with risk aversion. We show that exclusivity contracts, although they induce 
efficient risk-sharing, can be used not only to deter the entry of a more efficient rival 
on the product market but also to crowd out financial investors willing to insure 
buyers at competitive rates. Thus, exclusivity clauses can foreclose entry on both the 
product market and the financial market. We further show that in a world without 
financial investors exclusivity contracts are welfare-dominated by purely financial 
bilateral  instruments,  such  as  forward  contracts,  as  these  do  not  distort  product 
                                                       
2 An excellent overview is provided by Bernheim and Whinston (1999). 
3  Various  hedging  activities  conducted  by  firms  can  be  interpreted  as  evidence  that  they 
behave as if they were risk-averse; see, for instance, Gézci et al. (1997). The same applies to 
their input purchase behavior; see, e.g., Wolak and Kolstad (1991).   4 
market outcomes. Thus, we argue that there is no room for an insurance defense of 
exclusivity contracts. 
Our main result arises from the externalities which are present in the contracting 
process  between  the  incumbent  seller  and  the  risk-averse  buyer.  In  Aghion  and 
Bolton  (1987),  those  contracting  parties  have  a  joint  interest  in  agreeing  to  high 
liquidated  damages  for  breaching  the  contract,  in  order  to  force  a  more  efficient 
entrant to charge a low price. Hence, the contract they sign hurts a third party, the 
entrant. Now, if the buyer were to buy a forward contract from a financial investor to 
hedge its spot market risk, he would subsequently have an interest in signing an 
exclusivity contract with the incumbent in order to extract rent from this financial 
investor. Indeed, by signing a contract that completely forecloses entry, the buyer can 
ensure that the product price will remain high and thus forces the financial investor 
to be true to his promise of insuring the buyer against adverse spot market outcomes. 
Because this moral hazard problem is anticipated by financial investors, the market 
for financial instruments does not develop. As a result, the incumbent's behavior is 
not constrained by any competitive pressure and exclusivity contracts end up being 
used by him so as to extract rents from the entrant and from the main buyer. 
The problem we tackle is by no means hypothetical. For instance, in recent years, a 
series of cases involving energy companies were dealt with by European competition 
authorities.4 In the 2007 Distrigas decision, the European Commission accepted to 
close  an  abuse-of-dominant-position  case  after  the  main  Belgian  gas  distributor 
committed to reduce the gas volumes tied in long-term contracts and to decrease the 
duration of those contracts so as to make room for entrants. Similar requirements 
were implemented in decisions Synergen, Gas Natural/Endesa, Repsol or E.ON Ruhrgas. 
Each time, the concern was that an incumbent firm or merged entity could use long-
term  exclusivity  contracts  in  order  to  shield  a  big  portion  of  market  sales  from 
competitive  pressure.  In  French  case  KalibraXE,  which  gave  rise  to  a  preliminary 
decision in 2007, a small entrant complained that the former electricity monopolist 
                                                       
4 An early US antitrust case, United Shoe, can also be read along the Aghion and Bolton (1987) 
lines; see Brodley and Ma (1993).   5 
was using exclusivity provisions to prevent it from accessing industrial consumers 
ahead of the liberalization of the sector. The French competition authority stressed 
that  any  assessment  of  those  clauses  could  not  take  place  without  serious 
consideration being given (among other things) to the conditions under which those 
clauses could be terminated or breached, and the economic gains that accrued to 
customers under the contract, especially those derived from the certainty associated 
to a fixed price, which may justify its use in the face of its foreclosing effect.5 
There is an active literature about socially harmful instances of vertical foreclosure or 
entry deterrence through the use of vertical arrangements.6 When it comes to entry 
deterrence  of  a  potential  rival  by  an  incumbent  through  the  use  of  exclusivity 
contracts, two main lines of reasoning stand out of the literature. In Aghion and 
Bolton  (1987),  an  incumbent  firm  offers  an  exclusivity  contract  to  a  single  buyer 
before a potential rival decides about entry. By specifying damages for breaching the 
contract, the incumbent can ensure that, upon entry, the buyer pays a lower price. 
This lower market price translates into an additional surplus to the buyer, which the 
incumbent can extract upfront through the transaction price specified in the contract. 
Because  there  is  uncertainty  surrounding  the  cost  of  the  potential  entrant,  the 
incumbent  is  led  to  trade-off  the  likelihood  of  entry  with  surplus  extraction  and 
inefficiently deters entry. 
The other theory of harm is associated with the “naked exclusion” scenario put forth 
by  Rasmusen,  Ramseyer  and  Wiley  (1991)  and  Segal  and  Whinston  (2000a).  The 
model  explains  how  an  incumbent  firm  can  use  contracting  externalities  among 
several customers so as to prevent a potential entrant from reaching the minimum 
viable scale. A review of the most recent developments can be found in Argenton 
(2008). 
There  is  also  a  large  literature  describing  the  gains  in  efficiency  associated  with 
exclusivity contracts, which could arise from promoting relation-specific investments 
                                                       
5 See Conseil de la concurrence, Decision 07-MC-01 of 25 April 2007, especially recitals 48 and 
50. 
6 An excellent discussion is found in Rey and Tirole (2007).   6 
by solving the hold-up problem (e.g. de Meza and Selvaggi, 2007), reducing intra-
brand or inter-brand competition (e.g. Mathewson and Winter, 1984; Besanko and 
Perry, 1993), sharing risk (e.g. Rey and Tirole, 1986), or fostering efficient product 
selection (Yehezkel, 2008). Motta (2004) offers an accessible review of this line of 
research. 
By  contrast,  to  our  knowledge  there  are  few  contributions  studying  the  possible 
trade-off between efficiency gains and exclusionary effects, as we try in this paper, 
and they all focus on investment. An early example is Spiegel (1994), who shows that 
in a modified version of the Aghion and Bolton model, liquidated damages remain 
excessive and continue to serve as a barrier to entry even in the presence of relation-
specific investment (but may nonetheless have an overall positive on welfare). Spier 
and  Whinston  (1995)  thoroughly  study  this  issue  by  allowing  for  ex  post 
renegotiation of the exclusivity contract and looking at legal remedies. Fumagalli, 
Motta and Rønde (2007) explore the same issue but in a model that builds upon Segal 
and Whinston (2000b), rather than Aghion and Bolton (1987). 
Several papers have studied the impact of financial positions of firms on product 
market  competition.  The  main  message  in  this  literature  is  that  firms  may  use 
financial  contracts  as  a  commitment  device  to  affect  the  equilibrium  in  the  spot 
market and increase their overall profit. The precise strategy depends on the type of 
competition.  If  oligopolists  compete  à  la  Cournot,  then  they  will  sell  forward 
contracts (or integrate vertically) to compete more aggressively in the market, which 
increases their market share at the expense of the other participants (Allaz and Vila, 
1993). Willems (2005) shows that those results also hold for option contracts. On the 
other hand, if oligopolists compete à la Bertrand, then they have an incentive to buy 
forward contracts, and commit to being less aggressive (Mahenc and Salanié, 2004). 
The main result of this literature is that oligopolists that hedge themselves by signing 
(long term) contracts behave more competitively in the spot market. Willems and De 
Corte (2008) therefore argue that governments should regulate the risk exposure of 
(electricity) firms so as to give producers (retailers) an incentive to buy (sell) more 
forward contracts.   7 
This  literature  only  looks  at  the  effect  of  financial  contracts  on  spot  market 
competition  but  takes  their  existence  as  given  and  neglects  their  effects  on  entry 
incentives. In contrast, our paper studies the effect of long-term contracts on entry, 
and  it  further  addresses  the  issue  as  to  whether  the  market  for  derivatives  will 
develop when firms that are active on the product market have market power. 
The  structure  of  this  paper  is  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  we  present  a  model 
characterized by the presence of financial investors who could provide a risk-averse 
buyer with a hedge  against  spot  price  volatility.  In  section  3 we characterize the 
equilibrium of this model in various contracting environments. Section 4 discusses 
the welfare and policy implications and Section 5 concludes. 
2  Model 
This paper models the effect of long-term contracts signed between an incumbent 
producer and a risk-averse consumer. We study the potential trade off between the 
beneficial effect of a long-term relationship through risk sharing and the associated 
harmful effect through the exclusion of competitors. In order to do so, we extend the 
Aghion  and  Bolton  (1987)  model  by  introducing  risk-aversion  on  the  part  of  the 
buyer  and  by  giving  a  role  to  financial  investors  who  can  competitively  offer 
insurance  to  the  buyer.  In  the  three  scenarios  we  study  various  contractual 
relationships between the incumbent and the buyer. In the first scenario we assume 
that no contract can be signed between the two. In the second scenario the incumbent 
can offer an exclusive contract, as in the original model. In the third scenario the 
incumbent  can  offer  a  standard  financial  (forward)  contract  whereby  the  buyer 
promises to pay the incumbent the difference between the forward price and the spot 
price. 
Next  to  those  innovations,  two  additional,  related,  technical  modifications  of  the 
original model are introduced. 
First, we assume that there is a very small “fringe buyer” that does not sign a long-
term contract with the incumbent. This fringe buyer is introduced in the model to 
obtain a unique, meaningful spot price in the case when the incumbent firm and the   8 
main buyer sign a forward contract and are therefore perfectly hedged against any 
variation  in  the  spot  market  price.  (Without  it,  they  would  become  absolutely 
indifferent to the market outcome and there would be no meaningful competition 
between the incumbent and the entrant.) 
Second, we assume that it is not profitable for the entrant to enter the market if it can 
only supply fringe consumers. This is modeled by assuming that the entrant incurs a 
small entry cost. 
Those two modifications preserve the spirit of the original Aghion and Bolton (1987) 
model in which the entrant could not make any profit in case the buyer did not buy 
from her. 
2.1  Set-up of the game 
This being said, the precise set-up of the game follows the model of Aghion and 
Bolton (1987) as closely as possible. In the game there are five (types of) players: the 
main buyer, the fringe buyer, the incumbent, the entrant, and the financial investors. 
The main buyer buys at most one unit of the good. His reservation price for the good 
is equal to 1. The main buyer is risk-averse and his preferences are represented by a 
von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  function  U .  The  expected  utility  of  the  main 
buyer when consuming 1 unit of the good is equal to 
  [ (1 )] EU p −   (1) 
where expectations are taken over the different states of the world, and p  is the price 
faced by the buyer in a specific state. The utility function is upward-sloping and 
concave ( ' 0 U >  and  '' 0 U < ), and, for simplicity, is such that  (0) 0 U = . 
Next to the main buyer there is a small, risk-neutral fringe buyer who wants to buy ε 
units of the good. His expected utility of consuming ε units is equal to 
  (1 ) . E p ε   −     (2) 
The incumbent producer is risk-neutral and has a production cost  1 I c < . He seeks to 
maximize expected profit.   9 
The  entrant  producer  is  also  risk-neutral  and  has  a  production  cost  E c   which  is 
drawn from the uniform distribution over [0,1]. The cumulative distribution function 
of her production costs is thus  ( ) E E F c c = . Uncertainty about  E c  is the only source 
of uncertainty in our model.7 The entrant incurs a small entry cost K ε > . This entry 
cost guarantees that the entrant will not enter the market if she can only sell to the 
fringe buyer, as the profit she can then make,  ( ) E p c ε − , will always be smaller than 
the entry cost since  1 p ≤  and  0 E c ≥ . In order to simplify calculations, we take 
(1 ) K ε ε = + . The entrant strives to maximize expected profit. 
There  are  (at  least)  two  financial  investors,  who  are  risk-neutral  and  maximize 
expected profit from selling forward contracts. 
The game consists of 6 stages. In stage 1 the financial investors compete à la Bertrand 
for the sale of forward contracts to the main buyer. A forward contract stipulates that 
the buyer agrees to pay the seller the difference between the forward price, ϕ , set in 
the contract, and the spot market price,  p . Bertrand competition thus consists for 
financial investors in posting a forward price ϕ  and being committed to honor the 
corresponding contract upon acceptance by the main buyer. 
In stage 2, the main buyer decides whether he buys a forward contract from one of 
the financial investors. In case several investors offer the same contract, the main 
buyer randomly selects one. 
In stage 3, after observing the financial position of the main buyer, the incumbent 
makes him a take-it-or-leave-it offer. This offer can be of three types, depending on 
the scenario chosen. In the first scenario, the offer consists in not entering into any 
contractual relationship (no contract). In the second scenario, the offer consists in an 
exclusivity contract as in Aghion and Bolton (1987) where the buyer ex-ante agrees to 
pay price P  to the incumbent for acquiring one unit or pay penalty  0 P  if he breaches 
the contract. In the third scenario, the offer consists in a forward contract, according to 
                                                       
7 We solve for pure-strategy equilibria. Hence, there are no additional ‘strategic’ sources of 
risk in the model.    10 
which the main buyer promises to pay the incumbent the difference between the 
forward price, f , set in the contract, and the spot market price, p . 
In stage 4 of the game, the main buyer decides whether he accepts the offer of the 
incumbent or not.8 
In stage 5 the entrant and all other players in the game learn about  E c . The entrant 
decides whether she enters the market and incurs the entry cost. 
In stage 6, Bertrand competition takes place in the spot market. Active firms post 
bids. They are committed to serve all demand addressed to them at their posted 
price. The payoffs of the fringe buyer and the entrant depend directly on the spot 
market price and sales. The utility of the main buyer and the incumbent producer 
depends not only on the spot market sales but also on the contract(s) that they may 
have previously signed. 
We solve this game by backward induction. 
2.2  Efficiency 
We now characterize efficient market outcomes. From the point of view of social 
welfare, three dimensions matter: (i) allocative efficiency, (ii) productive efficiency, 
and (iii) risk sharing. As regards the first dimension, it is clear that, as the production 
costs are always lower than consumers’ willingness to pay, total production should 
be equal to 1 ε +  units. 
Second, production efficiency requires that the entrant enters the market only when 
she has such a production cost advantage vis-à-vis the incumbent as to outweigh her 
entry cost. Hence, entry should occur as long as the average total cost of the entrant 
(












) is smaller than the average production cost of the 
incumbent,  I c .  In  an  efficient  market,  the  probability  of  entry  is  thus  equal  to 
Prob( ) . E I I c c c ε ε < − = −  
                                                       
8 This of course inconsequential in the scenario where the incumbent offers no contract.   11 
Third, because the main buyer is risk-averse and other players are risk-neutral, the 
main buyer should be covered by insurance, be it from the main buyer or financial 
investors. At the optimum, the marginal utility of the main buyer should be equal 
across states of the world. This implies that the main buyer pays the same price, net 
of financial transfers, in all situations. 
3  Analysis 
We now take the three scenarios of interest (no contract, exclusivity contract, bilateral 
forward contract between the incumbent and the main buyer) in order and solve for 
subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
3.1  No contract 
In the first scenario, the incumbent cannot enter into a contractual relationship with 
the main buyer. Suppose first that the latter has not bought any forward contract 
from financial investors. Following the entrant’s decision to enter the market in stage 
5,  Bertrand  competition  determines  the  spot  market  price.  Thus,  the  equilibrium 
market price is given by 
  { } max , . I E p c c =   (3) 
In  case  the  entrant  decides  not  to  enter,  the  incumbent  will  charge  buyers  their 
reservation price and the spot market price will be equal to 1. 
In stage 3, the entrant will enter as long as she expects to obtain a positive profit. The 
precise condition is 
  ( )(1 ) (1 ) 0. I E c c ε ε ε − + − + ≥   (4) 
The first term stands for the profit she makes by selling 1 ε +  units at price  I c , while 
the second term is the entry cost. When  E I c c ε > − , the entrant chooses not to enter, 
for she would not make enough sales to cover the entry cost. Entry decisions are 
efficient, and the probability of entry is thus given by 
  Prob( ) . NC
E I I c c c φ ε ε = < − = −   (5)   12 
The main buyer derives a surplus only when entry occurs, so that his expected utility 
V  is 
 
( )









= ⋅ − + −
= − −
  (6) 
Consider now the case where the main buyer has bought a forward contract ϕ  from 
financial investors in stage 2. (All variables in that case will be annotated with a 
tilde.) In stage 6, the spot market price does not depend on the financial position of 
the main buyer and is still given by equation (3). Entry is still as in equation (5). 
The  main  buyer  is  perfectly  insured  and  receives  a  surplus  of  (1 ) U ϕ − , 
independently of the entry decision of the entrant: 
 
￿ (1 ( )) (1 ) (1 1 ( 1))
(1 )
NC
I I V U c c U
U
φ ϕ φ ϕ
ϕ
= − − − + − − − −
= −
  (7) 
In the financial market investors compete à la Bertrand. In expectation they will not 
make a profit and we have  (1 ) 1 I c φ φ ϕ ⋅ + − ⋅ = . Hence, given efficient entry, the 
forward price in stage 1 will be equal to: 
  1 ( ) (1 ) I I c c ϕ ε = − − ⋅ −   (8) 
The main buyer will buy such a contract in stage 2 as it will allow him to reduce 
uncertainty and gains from risk-sharing accrue to him. Indeed, his surplus is larger 
when he buys a forward contract than when he doesn't:  
  ￿ (( ) (1 )) ( ) (1 ) .
NC
NC
I I I I V U c c c U c V ε ε = − ⋅ − > − ⋅ − =   (9) 
This inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality. 
3.2  Exclusivity contract 
In the second scenario the incumbent is allowed to offer an exclusivity contract to the 
main buyer in stage 3.  
Suppose that the main buyer has bought a forward contract with forward price  ϕ  
from  financial  investors  and  agreed  to  an  exclusivity  contract  ( ) 0 , P P   with  the   13 
incumbent. Upon entry, Bertrand competition in the spot market takes place in stage 
6 of the game. The entrant and the incumbent post prices  I p and  E p . The fringe 
buyer buys its good from the producer with the lowest price at spot market price 
min{ , } E I p p p = .  
The main buyer will procure the good from the incumbent and pay the contractual 
price  P , or breach the contract, pay a penalty  0 P  and buy the good on the spot 
market  at  spot  market  price  p .  The  profit  of  the  main  buyer  is  equal  to 
(1 ( )) U P p ϕ − − − , if he does not breach the contract, and  0 (1 ( )) U p P p ϕ − − − − , 
if he decides to breach. The main buyer will breach only if the gains from breaching 
outweigh the penalty, that is, only if  0 P p P − ≤ . 
The market equilibrium thus depends upon the exclusivity contract ( 0 , P P ) signed 
between the main buyer and the incumbent and the production cost of the entrant 
E c . We can consider three cases. 
If  0 E P P c − < , then the entrant can never make enough profit to outweigh the entry 
cost. Given the parameters of the game, entry can only be profitable if she sells to the 
main buyer. However, in this instance she can only attract the main buyer by selling 
below cost.  
If  0 , I E P P c c − > ,  market  interaction  reduces  to  standard  Bertrand  competition. 
Both firms will post prices  { } max , I E I E p p c c = =  and both buyers will buy from 
the firm with the lowest marginal cost. 
If  0 E I c P P c < − < , then the entrant will instead post a price  E p  equal to  0 P P −  
and sell to both buyers. Indeed, by posting a higher price, she would make a higher 
margin on the fringe buyer but would not be able to convince the main buyer to 
breach and buy from her, which is unprofitable. 
Given  the  various  possibilities  above,  entry  takes  place  when 
0 min{ , } E I c c P P ε < − − . Since  E c  is uniformly distributed, the probability of entry 
is given by   14 
  0 min{ , - } . EC
I c P P φ ε = − ￿   (10) 
Hence, the key externality in this contracting model is that by its choice of P  and  0 P , 
the contracting pair can affect the entry decision of the potential entrant. 
At stage 3, the incumbent chooses  0 , P P  to maximize expected profit subject to the 
participation constraint of the main buyer and the entry decision of the entrant. In 
case the latter does not enter, then the incumbent charges price 1 to the fringe buyer, 
while the post-entry price is given by equation (3). 
The program of the incumbent is therefore the following: 




max (1 )( ) (1 )(1 )
. .
( ) 1 ( ) (1 ) 1 ( 1) (1 )
( ) min{ , }
( )
( ) 0 1
EC EC EC





P P c c
st
i U P p U P U
ii p c P P
iii p
iv
φ φ φ ε
φ ϕ φ ϕ ϕ
φ ε
φ
+ − − + − −








  (11) 
Assume  for  now  that  0 I P P c − <   (which  will  be  true  in  equilibrium),  then  the 
solution to this optimization problem is such that:  
  0 0, 1, 1 EC P P φ ε = = = − ￿   (12) 
That is, the incumbent chooses a corner solution at which entry does not occur at all 
and the contractual price is equal to one. If the main buyer is risk-neutral and the 
fringe  buyer  is  negligible  ( 0 ε = ),  this  follows  directly  from  the  optimization 
problem.  
To see this, notice that in that case the participation constraint of the buyer, (i), will 




0 1 Compensation of buyer


















￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
  (13) 
The profit of the incumbent consist of three parts: (1) the no-entry profit; (2) rent that 
can be extracted from the entrant; and (3) a compensation to the buyer for the loss in   15 
revenue on its financial contract. The two first terms make up for the total profit of 
the contracting pair while V  is the amount of money that must be rebated by the 
incumbent to the main buyer in order to induce him to accept the contract. 
It is as if the incumbent always served the buyer and charged price 1 as a result of 
monopoly power (part 1). Yet, when entry occurs, the incumbent is able to procure 
the good from the entrant at price  EC φ ￿  instead of producing it himself at higher cost 
I c . It is then as if the incumbent had monopsony power vis-à-vis the entrant and 
faced the usual monopsony trade-off between price and quantity (part 2). This is the 
mechanism  that  allows  the  contracting  pair  to  extract  rent  from  the  entrant.  In 
addition, entry affects the gains the buyer makes on its forward contract. Instead of 
benefiting from insurance when the entrant stays out (and the price is one), the main 
buyer receives less money from the financial investor when entry occurs (and the 
price is  EC φ ￿  instead). He must then be compensated for this in order to be willing to 
accept the contract. (part 3) 
The  incumbent  will  chose  a  corner  solution  1 EC φ = ￿   and  will  fully  exclude  the 
entrant as the compensation he needs to pay to the buyer in case of entry (part 3) is 
larger than the rent he could extract from the entrant (part 2). Marginally increasing 
the probability of entry increases rents received from the entrant at rate  2 EC
I c φ − ￿  
while it increases the compensation paid to the buyer at rate 1 2 EC φ − ￿ .  
In the case where the buyer is risk-averse and the fringe buyer cannot be neglected, 
this contract continues to be optimal. Indeed, (i) the participation constraint in (11) 
gets harder to satisfy when the buyer is risk-averse; hence, the incumbent can never 
achieve  a  higher  level  of  profit  than  under  risk-neutrality;  and  (ii)  the  solution 
specified in (12) is not risky for the main buyer; hence, it is also feasible under risk 
aversion. 
In  stage  1,  financial  investors  behave  competitively  as  a  result  of  Bertrand 
competition.  They  will  therefore  offer  a  forward  contract  making  zero  expected 
profit. If the incumbent is allowed subsequently to offer an exclusivity contract, then   16 
anticipating (12), the forward price  ϕ  at which investors will be willing to supply 
insurance will be equal to one. 
In stage 2, the main buyer will buy a forward contract whenever his utility of buying 
is larger than the utility he receives without insurance contract9, that is: 
  (1 ) ( ) (1 ) I I U c U c ϕ ε − > − ⋅ −   (14) 
Since financial investors only offer a contract with forward price equal to 1, the main 
buyer is not interested in buying. In effect, the possibility for the incumbent to offer 
an  exclusivity  contract  after  the  closure  of  the  financial  market  destroys  the 
possibility  of  insurance  arrangements  between  financial  investors  and  the  main 
buyer. 
Thus, in stage 3, the incumbent faces the same trade-off as in the original Aghion and 
Bolton (1987) model. The incumbent chooses P  and  0 P  so as to maximize expected 
profits, taking into account the participation constraint of the main buyer, and the 
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= − −
  (15) 
Indeed,  the  incumbent  recognizes  that  the  entrant  will  not  enter  unless  she  can 
convince the main buyer to switch. Upon entry, the incumbent therefore expects the 
latter to breach and pay penalty  0 P . Conversely, if the entrant stays out, the contract 
will be honored: the main buyer will get the good at contractual price P, while all 
surplus will be extracted from the fringe buyer by posting price 1. Two relations 
constrain the behavior of the incumbent, however. First, he has to leave the main 
buyer  with  at  least  as  much  utility  as  in  the  no-contract  case  in  order  to  induce 
                                                       
9 Note that the incumbent has all bargaining power in the game, the buyer will be kept at its 
reservation utility, it is, it will receive the utility it would receive the same utility as when he 
would refuse the contract. ( NC V .)   17 
acceptance  at  stage  4.  Second,  the  contract  terms  affect  the  likelihood  of  entry 
through their effect on the spot market price. 
Assume for the time being that  0 I P P c − < . (This will be true in equilibrium, for the 
contract has no impact on the market outcome otherwise.)  
Ignoring the profit made on the fringe buyer, the programme of the incumbent can 
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￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
  (16) 
The  profit  of  the  incumbent  consists  again  of  three  parts:  (1)  the  profit  of  the 
contracting pair in the absence of entry; (2) rent that can be extracted from the entrant 
by manipulating the entry decision; and (3) a compensation that the incumbent needs 
to leave to the buyer in order to induce him to accept the contract.  
It is as if the incumbent always sold the good to the main buyer at a price that is 
subject to monopoly power (part 1) and only constrained by the buyer's option to 
refuse the contract (part 3), but could buy the good from a supplier (the entrant) on 
which he exerted monopsony power (part 2). As in any monoposony calculation, the 
price at which the input is bought is thus determined by the trade-off between the 
quantity  purchased  and  the  price  paid.  Because  this  time  the  main  buyer  is  not 
insured against variation in the spot market price, a change in the probability of 
entry  leads  to  a  change  in  the  risk  born  by  the  main  buyer,  which  must  be 
compensated. This amount obviously depends on the level of risk-aversion of the 
main  buyer.  Indeed,  if  λ   stands  for  the  risk  premium  associated  to  the  lottery 
promising 1 I c −  with probability  I c  and zero otherwise, then we have: 
  (1 ) I I V c c λ = − − , 
which shows that the profit of the incumbent is increasing in the risk premium, that 
is, in the level of risk aversion. 
Of course, the presence of the fringe buyer slightly complicates the computation of 
the optimal pricing scheme. Solving the exact programme gives:   18 
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− = − −
− = +
  (17) 
That is, the main buyer is held at reservation utility level, while  0 P P −  is chosen so 
as  to  allow  for  entry  only  when  the  entrant’s  cost  is  below  about  half  the 
incumbent’s. 
3.3  Financial contract 
In the third scenario the incumbent offers the main buyer a financial contract which 
specifies that the main buyer has to transfer the amount  f p −  to the incumbent 
when the spot market closes at price p. A negative amount stands for a transfer from 
the  incumbent  to  the  main  buyer.  This is  a  forward (sale)  contract  with  forward 
price f . 
Assume  first  that  the  main  buyer  did  not  buy  a  forward  contract  from  financial 
investors in stage 2 but bought one from the incumbent in stage 4. Suppose that the 
entrant has decided to enter the market. In the pricing subgame, both the incumbent 
and the main buyer are perfectly hedged against the variations in the spot market 
price: they have already agreed to transact at price  f . Competition takes place only 
for  selling  to  the  fringe  buyer.  Both  producers  compete  à  la  Bertrand  and  in 
equilibrium they post the same price  { } max , I E I E p p c c = = , which determines the 
spot market price, p . Buyers buy from the firm with the lowest marginal cost. 
The entrant will enter only if her own marginal cost is small enough to allow her to 
make positive sales and cover the entry cost, so that the probability of entry is 
  . FC
I c φ ε = −   (18) 
In case the entrant stays out, then the incumbent will post a price  I p  equal to 1. He 
will then extract all surplus from the fringe buyer. By contrast, the forward contract 
caps the revenue to be made on the main buyer to f . 
In stage 3, the incumbent will thus offer then main buyer a contract solving   19 
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− ≥ − −
  (19) 
Observe  that  there  is  nothing  that  the  incumbent  can  do  to  affect  entry.  The 
programme thus boils down to extracting as much surplus as possible from the main 
buyer through the forward price by holding him to his reservation utility level: 
  ( ) (1 ) FC NC
I I V V c U c ε = = − −   (20) 
Suppose  now  that  the  main  buyer  has  bought  one  forward  contract  from  the 
incumbent at forward price  f  and one forward contract from a financial investor at 
forward price ϕ . 
The profit of the main buyer is equal to  (1 ( ) ( )) MB U p p f p ϕ − − − − −  where  p  is 
the spot market price and  MB p , the price at which the main buyer transacts. If the 
main buyer cannot affect the spot price by buying at a higher price himself, then the 
main buyer has an incentive to buy at the lowest possible price and  MB p p = . Hence, 
upon entry the price in the spot market is equal to the standard Bertrand outcome 
and the buyers buy from the firm with the lowest cost. 
In stage 5, the entrant will enter as long as it makes a positive profit in the spot 
market. Since the contractual arrangements do not affect the spot market outcomes, 
we have efficient entry happening with probability: 
  .
FC
I c φ ε = − ￿   (21) 
In stage 3, the incumbent maximizes its profit by selecting the price at which it will 
offer a forward contract to the main buyer. However, the incumbent cannot influence 
the probability of entry. 
The incumbent will only be willing to sell a forward contract to the main buyer if, in 
expectation, this increases his profit. This is the case if  1 (1 ) FC
I f c φ ≥ − − , i.e. if the 
forward price is at least as great as the fair “insurance price”.    20 
For the main buyer to accept such a contract, it should increase his utility. As taking 
an additional forward contract “over-insures” the main buyer (and hence is risky for 
him), he will only do so if the price is strictly lower than the fair “insurance price”. 
Hence, the incumbent and the buyer will not be able to sign a contract which is 
profitable to both of them. The equilibrium thus dictates that the incumbent will offer 
a forward contract which is at most actuarially fair and that the main buyer will 
decline to take it. 
In stage 1, financial investors, anticipating that their deal is not threatened by the 
possibility  for  the  incumbent  subsequently  to  offer  a  forward  contract,  will  sell 
insurance to the main buyer at the fair insurance price. In stage 2, the main buyer will 
accept the forward contract of the financial investors as it guarantees a utility of  
  ( ) ( )(1 ) NC
I I U c c V ε − − >   (22) 
Entry will be efficient. 
4  Discussion 
4.1  Normative implications 
Table  1  summarizes  the  results  of  section  3.  It  describes  for  the  three  kinds  of 
contractual relationships —no contract (NC), exclusivity contract (EC), and forward 
contract (FC)— whether the financial market will develop, whether the main buyer is 
insured, and whether entry in the market is efficient.  
Scenario   Contracts that the 










NC  None  Yes  Yes  Yes 
EC  Exclusive Contract  No  Yes  No 
FC  Forward Contract  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Table 1 Market Outcome in the three scenarios  
The main buyer will be insured in all scenarios, whether by buying forward contract 
from  financial  investors,  or  whether  by  signing  an  exclusivity  contract  with  the 
incumbent.   21 
Entry is efficient as long as the incumbent is not allowed to use exclusive contracts. If 
exclusive contracts are allowed, then there is too little entry.  
Financial  markets  will  only  develop  if  the  incumbent  is  not  allowed  to  sign  an 
exclusivity contract.  If the incumbent is allowed to offer such an exclusive contract, 
then  financial  investors,  wary  of  moral  hazard,  will  offer  forward  contracts  at 
prohibitive prices and the financial market will break down. 
Risk sharing 
 
Entry  Scenario   Financial 
investors 
present? 
Contracts that the 
incumbent is 
allowed to sign  Main buyer  Incumbent  Incumbent  Entrant 
Total 
Surplus 
Benchmark  No  None  0  0  0  0  0 
NC  Yes  None  *  0  0  0  * 
EC  Yes  Exclusive Contract  0  *  +  --  *- 
FC  Yes  Financial Contract  *  0  0  0  * 
* surplus created by hedging the risk of the main buyer 
+ positive change in surplus associated to entry distortion 
-- negative change in surplus associated to entry distortion  
Table 2: Surplus of Main Buyer, Incumbent and Entrant in the three scenarios 
Table  2  presents  the  utility  levels  of  the  three main  players:  the  main  buyer,  the 
incumbent  and  the  entrant.  Utilities  levels  are  normalized  with  respect  to  a 
benchmark scenario. The benchmark assumes that financial investors are absent and 
that  the  incumbent  is  not  allowed  to  offer  any  contract.  The  utility  levels  of  the 
players are affected by the development of financial markets (column 3 in Table 1) 
and by the entry decisions (column 5 in Table 1). Table 2 disentangles the utility 
effects of those two factors.  
Gains from insuring the main buyer accrue entirely either to him or to the incumbent 
(the financial market, when it develops, is competitive and all gains accrue to the 
main buyer) and they are denoted by a star. Distorting entry by forcing the entrant to 
price low penalizes the entrant (minus signs) but benefits the incumbent (plus sign). 
Changes in total surplus are found by summing all effects. 
We first discuss the effect for the main buyer. As long as the financial market does not 
develop, the incumbent has all the bargaining power vis-à-vis the main buyer. He 
will keep the main buyer at his reservation utility level, which is determined by the 
outside option in which the main buyer does not sign any contract. Hence, the main   22 
buyer’s utility is identical in the benchmark scenario and the exclusivity contract 
scenario (EC). If the financial market develops, the incumbent loses his dominant 
position in the insurance market, and the main buyer will buy a forward contract 
from financial investors at the competitive rate. The surplus of the main buyer will 
therefore increase in scenarios NC and FC. 
Entry  is efficient  in  all scenarios, except  for  the  EC  scenario.  In  this  scenario  the 
entrant  obtains  a  lower  profit.  She  is  indifferent  between  all  other  scenarios  ( 
benchmark, FC and NC) since entry is unaffected.  
The  profit  of  the  incumbent  depends  on  two  parts.  First,  by  restricting  entry,  the 
incumbent  can  extract  rents  from  the  entrant.  The  profit  of  the  incumbent  thus 
increases under scenario EC. Second, selling insurance to the main buyer is profitable 
for the incumbent if he is the sole seller of forward contracts. He then has monopoly 
power in the insurance market. He obtains this monopoly profit in the insurance 
market only in the EC scenario. In the other scenarios the incumbent does not sign a 
contract with the main buyer (benchmark, NC and FC), and those give the incumbent 
the lowest profit. Hence, if the incumbent were free to set the terms of the contract 
offered  to  the  incumbent,  our  model  would  predict  the  use  of  contracts  with 
exclusivity clauses, even when a standard forward contract is available on financial markets 
to arrange for risk-sharing.  
We now compare the various scenarios from the point of view of total surplus (last 
column in Table 2). Efficiency requires that the main buyer is insured and efficient 
entry. In all cases, the main buyer ends up insured; only the distribution of gains 
from risk sharing is affected. In contrast, the use of exclusivity contracts allows the 
incumbent  inefficiently  to  deter  entry.  Thus,  scenario  NC  and  scenario  FC  are 
equivalent and welfare-dominate scenario EC in the presence of financial investors. 
4.2  In the absence of financial investors 
It is possible that financial markets do not develop for reasons that are unrelated to 
the moral hazard problem we identify in this paper. Liquidity is an obvious issue: 
with a limited number of buyers in the industry, there may be few agents interested   23 
in trading derivatives. One can thus wonder how the conclusions of our analysis are 
affected by the absence of financial investors. 
The analysis in section 3 of those subgames in which the main buyer had not bought 
a forward contract from financial investors allows us to answer this question. Table 3 
summarizes the outcomes in the three scenarios when financial investors are absent. 











None  No  Yes 
EC  Exclusive Contract  Yes  No 
FC  Financial Contract  Yes  Yes 
Table 3 Summary of the three scenarios in the absence of financial investors 
In this context, scenario NC actually corresponds to the benchmark we considered 
above. As long as the incumbent is able to contract with the main buyer, the latter 
ends-up insured against price volatility. Scenario EC distorts entry, whereas the use 
of a forward contract (or the absence of contract) does not distort the product market 
outcome.  
Table 4 compares the utility levels of the various scenarios. The main buyer achieves 
the  same  utility  level  in  each  scenario  because  the  incumbent  has  all  bargaining 
power,  and  holds  the  main  buyer  at  his  no  contract  reservation  utility.  The 
incumbent, as long as he can contract with the main buyer, captures the gains from 
risk sharing (as financial investors are absent there is no competitive pressure on the 
incumbent in providing insurance). In addition he can extract some rents from the 
entrant  by  using  an  exclusivity  contract  to  force  low  post-entry  prices.  Thus,  he 
makes  more  profit  in  scenario  EC  and  our  model  would  still  predict  the  use  of 
contracts with exclusivity clauses in the absence of financial investors. 
Therefore, the incumbent prefers scenario EC to scenario FC. Therefore, even in the 
absence of financial investors, if the incumbent had the choice of the contract to offer 
to the main buyer, our model would predict the emergence of exclusivity contracts in 
equilibrium.   24 
We  now  compare  total  surplus  in  the  difference  scenarios.  Scenario  FC  Pareto-
dominates  the  NC  outcome,  as  the  surpluses  of  the  main  buyer  and  the  entrant 
remain constant, while the profit of the incumbent increases. Allowing a financial 
contract  improves  risk  sharing  between  the  entrant  and  the  incumbent,  without 
restricting entry.  
Risk sharing 
 
Entry  Scenario   Contracts that the 
incumbent is 
allowed to sign  Main 
buyer 





None  0  0  0  0  0 
EC  Exclusive Contract  0  *  +  --  *- 
FC  Financial Contract  0  *  0  0  * 
* surplus created by hedging the risk of the main buyer 
+ positive change in surplus associated to entry distortion 
-- negative change in surplus associated to entry distortion  
Table 4: Surplus of Main Buyer, Incumbent and Entrant in the absence of financial investors 
If we replace the financial contract (FC) with an exclusivity contract (EC), then the 
profit of the incumbent goes up, the entrant is worse off and the main buyer remains 
at his reservation utility. The equilibrium is however suboptimal, as entry happens 
too little of the time. The incumbent acts as a monopsonist which drives down the 
post-entry price, extracting rents from the entrant. This leads to a deadweight-loss: 
the joint profit of the incumbent and entrant decreases.  
Comparing exclusive contract and the no contract scenario (EC vs NC), we identify 
the following trade-off: with the exclusive contract, entry is inefficient, but the main 
buyer is insured. Which of the two effects dominates, depends on the risk aversion of 
the main buyer. If the main buyer is very risk-averse, then the value of eliminating 
price risk is very high and may more than compensate for the inefficient entry profile 
associated to exclusivity. 
Comparing the results of this section with the previous one allows us to determine 
the role of financial markets. Their development has two effects. (1) It improves the 
bargaining position of the main buyer vis-à-vis the incumbent as long as the financial 
market does not break down. (2) It provides an alternative hedging instrument for 
the main buyer if the incumbent is not allowed to sign contracts. The first effect does   25 
not affect total surplus, as it merely is a transfer between the main buyer and the 
incumbent.  The  second  effect  increases  efficiency  in  the  scenarios  in  which  the 
incumbent is not allowed to sign any contract with the main buyer. 
4.3  Policy implications 
Often,  an  incumbent  firm  and  a  buyer  will  sign  an  exclusivity  contract.  If  this 
contract is questioned by antitrust authorities, the parties will typically present an 
efficiency defense running along the following lines: 
(1) The future price of the good is uncertain, and the buyer is risk-averse. Hence the 
buyer would like to sign a contract to hedge its risk. 
(2) A financial market does not exist in the sector; hence, the buyer needs to turn to 
the incumbent as a counterparty in a trade to reduce its risk 
In this paper, we show that, although both arguments are seemingly correct, it does 
not follow that an insurance defense of exclusivity contracts should be allowed. 
Our model shows that if the incumbent can choose what contract to offer the main 
buyer, then he will go for an exclusivity contract. This contract will insure the buyer 
against variations in the spot price. Financial investors will not be willing to offer 
insurance to the buyer, and financial markets will not develop. If the buyer is very 
risk-averse, this outcome may socially be preferred to a situation without contracts.  
Hence, the arguments of the parties are seemingly correct. 
However, insuring the buyer should not be allowed as an efficiency defense for using 
exclusivity contracts. Those contracts not only foreclose the product market but also 
hinder the development of financial markets, which could provide alternative means 
for the buyer to hedge his risk. They can be the cause of the problem they allegedly 
set to solve! 
Of course, other causes may be at play for the financial market not to develop. Even 
in those situations where alternative insurance providers are unavailable, insurance 
should not be allowed as an efficiency defense for exclusivity clause. The use of a 
simple financial forward contract socially dominates exclusive dealing, as it hedges 
the  buyer  without  distorting  entry.  Such  a  forward  contract  does  not  require  a   26 
financial market to exist, and can be signed between the buyer and the incumbent as 
long as there exists a well-functioning spot market, upon whose price to base the 
contract.  
We therefore conclude that there is no room for an insurance defense of exclusionary 
exclusive dealing arrangements. 
4.4  Reservations 
Following Aghion and Bolton (1987), we have made strong assumptions about the 
elasticity of demand. Demand is perfectly inelastic, hence market power does not 
directly lead to a reduction of total surplus in the market.  
In the model with financial contracts, after entry the price in the spot market will be 
equal to the marginal cost of the incumbent. Fierce competition drives down the 
price, to the point where the incumbent is no longer making a profit. Given this 
assumption, entry will be efficient, as the entrant pays a price which is equal to the 
profit loss of the incumbent. If competition were be less fierce, the price upon entry 
could be higher, and we could obtain too much entry in the market.  
We have assumed that the “fringe buyer” is very small. If this were not the case, we 
would  expect  results  to  change.  The  presence  of  a  large  fringe  buyer  creates 
additional contracting externalities. In relative terms, this makes exclusion cheaper 
for the incumbent as he will be able to extract rents not only from the entrant, but 
also from the fringe buyer. As a result, deadweight loss will further increase. The 
precise nature of those results further depends on how entry costs and market size 
are related. A detailed discussion of these effects is outside the scope of the paper.  
In the case of the financial contract we assumed that main buyer and the incumbent 
sign a financial contract that fully hedged their positions, i.e. they signed a forward 
contract for exactly one unit of output. In Argenton and Willems (2008), we show 
that  the  incumbent  may  be  able  to  exclude  the  entrant  if  he  sells  more  financial 
contracts than the amount of contracts that fully hedges his position. In other words, 
the incumbent can achieve entry deterrence if he speculates.   27 
5  Conclusion  
In  this  paper,  we  have  revisited  the  seminal  Aghion  and  Bolton  model  by 
introducing risk-aversion on the part of the buyer, leaving some room for financial 
markets to  develop, and  allowing for  a richer contracting environment.  We  have 
shown that from the point of view of efficiency, exclusivity contracts, although useful 
in hedging a risk-averse buyer, are instrumental in allowing the incumbent seller to 
exclude its rivals both on the product market and the financial market. Even in the 
absence of financial investors, a simple forward contract can take care of insuring 
consumers without distorting entry. So, there appears to be no room for an insurance 
justification for using exclusivity contracts whenever direct financial arrangements 
are  possible.  On  the  contrary,  we  have  shown  that  an  incumbent  would  always 
prefer to offer an exclusivity contract, as this contract form allows him to extract 
more surplus from the main buyer and the potential entrant. This comes at the cost of 
preventing financial markets to develop. We therefore conclude that by allowing an 
insurance  defense  of  exclusivity  contracts,  policy-makers  would  run  the  risk  of 
favoring anti-competitive incumbents at great cost to both the real and the financial 
sides of the economy. 
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